We concentrate on discussing a class of two-person zero-sum games with rough payoffs. Based on the expected value operator and the trust measure of rough variables, the expected equilibrium strategy and r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are defined. Five cases whether the game exists r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy are discussed, and the technique of genetic algorithm is applied to find the equilibrium strategies. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed technique.
Introduction
Game theory is widely applied in many fields, such as, economic and management problems, social policy, and international and national politics since it is proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern 1 . Peski 2 presented the simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparison of information structures in zero-sum games and solved an problem, which is how to find the value of information in zero-sum games. Owena and McCormick 3 analyzed a "manhunting" game involving a mobile hider and consider a deductive search game involving a fugitive, then developed a model based on a base-line model. The traditional game theory assumes that all data of a game are known exactly by players. However, there are some games in which players are not able to evaluate exactly some data in our realistic situations. In these games, the imprecision is due to inaccuracy of information and vague comprehension of situations by players. For these uncertain games, many scholars have made contribution and got some techniques to find the equilibrium strategies of these games. Some scholars, such as, Berg and Engel 4 , Ein-Dor and Kanter 5 , Takahashi 6 , discussed a two-person zero-sum matrix game with random payoffs. Xu 7 made use of linear programming method to discuss two-person zero-sum game with grey 2 International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences number payoff matrix. Harsanyi 8 made a great contribution in treating the imprecision of probabilistic nature in games by developing the theory of Bayesian games. Dhingra et al. 9 combined the cooperative game theory with fuzzy set theory to yield a new optimization method to herein as cooperative fuzzy games and proposed a computational technique to solve the multiple objective optimization problems. Then Espin et al. 10 proposed an innovative fuzzy logic approach to analyze n-person cooperative games and theoretically and experimentally examined the results by analyzing three-case studies.
Although many cooperative and noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs are researched much by many scholars, there is still a kind of games with uncertain payoffs to be discussed little, that is, games with rough payoffs. Since rough set theory is proposed and studied by Pawlak 11, 12 , it is drastic to be applied into many fields, such as, data mining and neural network. Nurmi et al. 13 introduced three uncertainty events in social choice such as the impreciseness of a probabilistic, fuzzy, and rough type, further explored difficult issues of how diverse types of impreciseness can be combined, and in particular the combination of roughness with randomness and fuzziness in voting games. Liu 14 proposed a new concept of rough variable which is a measurable function from rough space to R. Based on the concept of rough variable, a game with rough payoffs is studied in this paper.
In game theory, it is an important task to define the concepts of equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. However, in these games with uncertain payoffs, there are no concepts of equilibrium strategies to be accepted widely. Campos 15 has proposed several methods to solve fuzzy matrix games based on linear programming but has not defined explicit concepts of equilibrium strategies. As the extension of the idea of Campos 15 , Nishizaki and Sakawa 16 discussed multiobjective matrix game with fuzzy payoffs. Maeda 17 has defined Nash equilibrium strategies based on possibility and necessity measures and investigated its properties.
In this paper, based on the concept of rough variable proposed by Liu 14 , we discuss a simplest game, namely, the game in which the number of players is two and rough payoffs which one player receives are equal to rough payoffs which the other player loses. We defined two kinds of concepts of maximin equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recalls some definitions and properties about two-person zero-sum game and the rough variable. Then two concepts of equilibrium strategies of two-person zero-sum game with rough payoffs are introduced and then their properties are deduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we proposed the technique of GA to solve some complicated game problems with rough payoffs which can be converted into crisp programming problem. Then a numerical example is discussed to show the effectiveness of the prosed theory and algorithm in Section 5. Finally, the conclusion has been made in Section 6.
Basic Concepts of Two-Person Zero-Sum Game and Rough Variable
In this section, let us recall the basic definitions of the two-person zero-sum game in 18 . The concept and properties of rough variable proposed by Liu 14 is also reviewed.
Two-Person Zero-Sum Game
In the game theory, the decision makers realize sufficiently the affection of their actions to others. The two-person zero-sum game is the simplest case of game theory in which how International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences 3 much one player receives is equal to how much the other loses. When we assume that both players give pure, mixed strategies see Parthasarathy and Raghavan 19 , such a game has been well resolved. But in our realistic world, there are also some noncooperative cases though more cooperation may exist in games. In reality, the non-cooperation between players may be vague. This paper mainly deals with the kind of games with rough payoffs.
In the two-person zero-sum game, what one player receives is equal to how much the other loses which could be illustrated by the following m × n matrix:
where P denotes the payoff matrix of player I, x ij is the payoff of player I when player I proposes the strategy i, and player II proposes the strategy j. Then, the payoff matrix of player II is −P . 20 . Let U be a universe and X a set representing a concept. Then its lower approximation is defined by
and the upper approximation is defined by
where R is the similarity relationship on U. Obviously, we have X ⊆ X ⊆ X.
Definition 2.5 Pawlak 11 . The collection of all sets having the same lower and upper approximations is called a rough set, denoted by X, X . Its boundary is defined as follows:
Liu 14 also gave a new concept about rough variable. This paper mainly refers to this book. The following results will be used extensively. Definition 2.6. Let Λ be a nonempty set, A a σ-algebra of subsets of Λ, Δ an element in A, and π a nonnegative, real-valued, additive set function. Then Λ, Δ, A, π is called a rough space.
Definition 2.7.
A rough variable ξ on the rough space Λ, Δ, A, π is a function from Λ to the real line R such that for every Borel set O of R, we have
2.7
The lower and the upper approximations of the rough variable ξ are then defined as follows: When we do not have information enough to determine the measure π for a real-life problem, we can assumes that all elements in Λ are equally likely to occur. For this case, the measure π may be viewed as the Lebesgue measure. In this paper, we only consider the rough 
Two Kinds of Equilibrium Strategies of Two-Person Zero-Sum Game with Rough Payoffs
Let consider the following example before defining the two-person zero-sum game with rough payoffs. When playing a Chinese poker, there are two teams which are constructed by two persons. Without loss of generality, we assume that Team A is the dealer, then its rule is as follows.
1 If the score Team B gets is less than 40, Team A goes on being a dealer and rises of one grade, denoted as 1.
From the description, we know that the rule has determined a kind of classification which is regard as an equivalent relation by Pawlak 12 on the universe 0, 100 . This means that obtaining 45 or 75 expresses the same meaning, and they are equivalent or indiscernible. Thus, the rough variable ξ 40, 80 , 0, 100 is applied to describe the above process and its trust measure expresses the probability that Team A obtains 1, or 0, or −1 in every game. In the following part, we will only consider the rough variable which is combined by the payoff.
Let the rough variable ξ ij represent the payoff that the player I receives or player II loses, then a rough payoff matrix is presented as follows to denote a two-person zero-sum game:
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When player I and player II, respectively, choose the mixed strategies x and y, the rough payoffs of player I are
Basic Definition of Two Kinds of Equilibrium Strategies
Because of the vagueness of rough payoffs, it is difficult for players to choose the optimal strategy. Naturally, we consider how to maximize players' or minimize the opponent's rough expected payoffs. Based on this idea, we propose the following maximin equilibrium strategy. 
where P is defined by 3.1 .
Remark 3.2.
Since the rough variables ξ are independent, then for any mixed strategies x and y, according to Remark 2.10, we have that
According to the definition of trust measure of rough variable, we can get another way to convert the rough variable into a crisp number. Then we propose another definition of Nash equilibrium to this game. Definition 3.3. Let rough variable ξ ij i 1, 2, . . . , m, j 1, 2, . . . , n represent the payoffs that the player receives or player II loses when player I gives the pure strategy i and player II gives the pure strategy j. r is the predetermined level of the payoffs, r ∈ R. Then x * , y * is called the r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy if
The Existence of Two Kinds of Equilibrium Strategies
In the following part, we will introduce the equilibrium strategy under the expected operator and the trust measure, respectively.
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The Existence of Expected Maximin Equilibrium Strategies
When the players' payoffs are crisp numbers, we know that the game surely has a mixed Nash equilibrium point. Then we will discuss if there is an expected maximin equilibrium strategy when the payoffs ξ ij are characterized as rough variables. Suppose that x x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m is any one mixed strategy of player I. In 3.7 , for every k, we multiply x k to every inequality. Then
3.8
Similarly, we can prove
Thus, the strategy x * , y * is an expected maximin equilibrium strategy to the game. This completes the proof. (i 1, 2, . . . , m, j 1, 2 For every x k k 1, 2, . . . , m , we define
Theorem 3.5. In a two-person zero-sum game, rough variables ξ ij
3.11
3.12
Now, we will prove E s 
The Existence of r-Trust Maximin Equilibrium Strategies
Through the proof of Theorem 3.5, we know that there at least exists an expected maximin equilibrium strategy to any two-person zero-sum game with rough payoffs. Now we will discuss the existence of r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy to this kind of game. 
3.16
where 
3.18
Suppose that 
3.21
This completes the proof. Thus, all strategies x, y are r-trust maximin equilibrium strategies. This completes the proof. Proof. The proof is similar with that of Theorem 3.7.
After discussing two particular cases, let us consider the usual case if there exists rtrust maximin equilibrium strategy x, y . (i 1, 2, . . . , m, j 1, 2, . . . , n) represent the payoffs player I receives or player II loses, and the payoff matrix P is defined by 3.1 . For a predetermined number r, if for all x, y , they cannot satisfy anyone of the following conditions:
Theorem 3.9. In a two-person zero-sum game, rough variables ξ ij
(1) x T Dy ≤ r, (2) x T By ≤ r ≤ x T Dy, (3) x T Ay ≤ r ≤ x T By, (4) x T Cy ≤ r ≤ x T Ay, (5) r ≤ x T
Cy, then there does not exist one r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy.
Proof. Let us only discuss one of five cases, the others are considered similarly. Suppose
If not all x, y ∈ S, then without loss of generality we can suppose other x, y ∈ Q. If there exists a r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy x * , y * in S, according to Lemma 3.6, we have 
Since S / Φ, then for the strategy x * , there exists strategy x * , y such that
It is apparent that Tr{x * T Py * ≥ r} ≥ Tr{x T Cy > r}. Namely, Tr{x * T Py * ≥ r}/ < Tr{x * T Cy > r}. This is in conflict with the definition of r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy too. Then there does not exist a r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy in this case.
The other cases can be proved in the same way. This completes the proof.
According to Theorem 3.9, we know that this game exists r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy x * , y * only if all strategies x, y are in some section, for example, x T By ≤ r ≤ x T Dy. Next let us discuss the following case that all strategies x, y are in some section. 
3.30
where s 1/ x T Dy − x T Cy , t py, x is any fixed vector.
Proof. For all strategies x, y satisfying x T By ≤ r ≤ x T Dy, the trust measure function of payoffs matrix P is characterized by the following equation:
According to the definition of r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy, whether the game equilibrium has an equilibrium strategy in M is equal to the following two problems.
For any fixed y,
3.32
For any fixed x,
3.33
is as follows. Generate a random number c ∈ 0, 1 and if c < P c , then the chromosome x i , y i is selected as a parament, where the parameter P c which is the probability of crossover operation. Repeat this process N pop-size times and we get P c · N pop-size parent chromosomes to undergo the crossover operation. The crossover operator on x 1 , y 1 and x 2 , y 2 will produce two children as follows:
The children of chromosomes X 1 , Y 1 and X 2 , Y 2 can be generated as above. They are feasible if they are both in X and then we replace the parents with them. Or else we keep the feasible one if it exists. Redo the crossover operator until we obtaine two feasible children or a given number of cycles is finished.
5 Mutation operation: a mutation operator is a random process where one genotype is replaced by another to generate a new chromosome. Each genotype has the probability of mutation, P m , to change from 0 to 1. Let x i , y i be selected as parent. Choose a mutation direction d ∈ R m n randomly. M is an appropriate large positive number. We replace the parent x i , y i with the child
If X i , Y i are infeasible, we set M as a random number between 0 and M until it is feasible and then replace x i , y i with it. Above all, it can be simply summarized in Procedure 1.
Numerical Example
Game theory is widely applied in many fields, such as, economic and management problems, social policy, and international and national politics; sometimes players should consider the state of uncertainty. A kind of games are usually characterized by rough payoffs. In this section, we give an example of two-person zero-sum game with rough payoffs to illustrate the effectiveness of the algorithm introduced above. There is a game between player I and player II. When player I gives strategy i and player II gives strategy j, player II will give some money to player I which is at least between c ij and a ij , or at most between b ij and d ij . The payoff matrix of player I is as follows 
5.2
Firstly, let us consider the expected maximin equilibrium strategy of this game. According to Remarks 2.9 and 3.2, we have that
where Then, we can get the equilibrium strategy that when player I gives the mixed strategy x 0, 0, 1 and player II gives the mixed strategy y 0, 1, 0 , player I gets the most payoff 20 which is the least payoffs player II loses. 
5.5
Then we give five predetermined numbers r and discuss if the game exists a r-trust maximin equilibrium strategy. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a class of two-person zero-sum matrix games with rough payoffs. Firstly, we have given the definition of the game with rough payoffs and then proposed two kinds of equilibrium strategy. Secondly, we have discussed wether the twoperson zero-sum matrix games with rough payoffs exist the equilibrium strategy. Thirdly, we proposed the genetic algorithm to solve the most complicated case. It is an available and efficient way to search the equilibrium of this kind of games with rough payoffs. Lastly, the numerical example illustrated well our research methods. We have only considered one kind of games with uncertain payoffs. Of course, there are many other games with uncertain payoffs which need to be researched.
